Animal Aid

The author of our second article in the Great Debate, Adam Kyd, is a vegan who is currently studying philosophy and sociology at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.

In the following essay, I will explore the question: 'how far, if at all, should we extend moral consideration beyond the human community?' Firstly, I will provide a background to ethics. Secondly, I will define utilitarianism and provide its response to the question. Thirdly, I will define rights theory and deal with its approach to the question. Fourthly, I will outline deep ecology and its approach in the animals debate. Fifthly, I will return to rights theory and give an alternative view expounded by another rights theorist. Finally, I will conclude.

Ethics takes the view of the impartial spectator (Singer 1993: 11-12). It is a universal view that requires us to go beyond the subjective, beyond our own desires and preferences to an objective standpoint (Singer 1993: 11-12). When I make an ethical judgement I must accept that my interests do not count more than the interests of anyone else (Singer 1993: 11-12). From this concept we can derive the concept of equal consideration of interests. The principle of equal consideration is common amongst all ethical theories. Jeremy Bentham expressed this principle in his famous equation: "Each to count for one and none more than one" (Singer 1996: 8), This principle requires that we treat equally the like interests of every being capable of having interests (Singer 1996: 8).

Utilitarianism is a moral theory that says that what is right in a certain situation is dependant on the consequences of our actions and we should choose the action which maximises what is considered good (Francione 2000: 131). To a classical utilitarian like Jeremy Bentham (the founder of utilitarianism) happiness is the ultimate good (Francione 2000: 131, 135). Whereas to a preference utilitarian like Peter Singer the satisfaction of preferences is the ultimate good (Francione 2000: 135).

Singer argues that the principle of equal consideration applies not only to humans but also to all sentient beings (beings capable of experiencing pain and pleasure) (Singer 1993: 55). Singer points out that sentience is the essential characteristic for eligibility into the moral community (Singer 1993: 57). He illustrates this with Jeremy Bentham's famous testimony of animal's rightful place in the moral community: "...A full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would avail? The question is not, Can they reason? Nor can they talk? but, can they suffer?" (Bentham in Singer 1993: 57).

On how we know that animals feel pain Singer says two things. Firstly, that the central nervous systems of vertebrates are essentially alike to ours. Secondly, sentience gives an animal an advantage in survival (Benton 1996: 21). For these reasons the sole attribution of sentience to humans is highly unlikely (Benton 1996: 21). On the other hand, though many have used the claim that 'plants feel pain too' as an argument against vegetarianism, their claim is unsubstantiated. Sensational claims of observing behaviour that suggests pain sensation have not been substantiated and plants don't have a central nervous system similar to ours (Singer 1993: 70).

Without the capacity to suffer or experience pleasure, without sentience, a being has no interests (Singer 1993: 57). According to Singer, there is no moral reason for denying moral consideration to a being that suffers (Singer 1993: 57). Equal consideration demands that the suffering of one being be counted equally with the like suffering of another being (Singer 1993: 57). To deny equal consideration to a being on the basis of species alone is amoral - it is to draw an arbitrary line. An individual who does so is guilty of speciesism (Garner 1996: 2). Speciesists violate the principle of equal consideration by giving greater weighting to the interests of their own species than the interests of other species (Singer 1993: 58). Just as someone who discriminates on the basis of race is racist, someone who discriminates on the basis of species is speciesist (Singer 1993: 58).

On the question of whether we in industrialized nations are wrong or right in consuming animal flesh, Singer says that it cannot be morally justified. This is due to the inherent cruelty of modern factory farming methods. Animals in modern agricultural systems live far from pleasant lives (Singer 1993: 63-64). The end is neither swift nor painless (Singer 1993: 63-64). Since our interest in animal flesh is only a minor interest (people like the taste of meat) and the equal consideration principle forbids important interests (the animals interest in not suffering) being sacrificed for minor interests - meat eating in industrialized nations is not morally justifiable (Singer 1993: 63-64).

An argument frequently used as an objection to vegetarianism is the argument, "Animals eat each other, so why shouldn't we eat them?" (Singer 1993: 70). Singer gives a number of reasons why this argument is flawed. Firstly, when animals kill for food it is done out of necessity (Singer 1993: 71). Secondly, it is unusual that people who typically view the behaviour of animals as brutish and crude should, when it pleases them, use an argument that suggests we should turn to animals for moral instruction (Singer 1993: 71). Thirdly and most importantly, animals are unable to reflect on the ethics of their diet. Therefore, animals cannot be held responsible for killing other animals and do not 'deserve' to be treated in the same way they treat other animals (Singer 1993: 71).

Though Singer believes we should extend moral consideration to sentient animals he argues there is nothing wrong in killing an animal that is 'merely' sentient if the animal is killed painlessly (Singer 1993: 90). Singer distinguishes between persons, such as normal adult humans, and 'merely' sentient animals. Singer, as a preference utilitarian, believes that killing a person who has a preference for continued existence is wrong unless this preference is outweighed by opposing preferences (Singer 1993: 94). This is because a person is a self-conscious being - self-conscious beings see themselves as distinct entities with a future and have preferences for the future (Singer 1993: 90, 95). To kill a person thwarts their preference for continued existence as well as their future oriented preferences (Singer 1993: 94-95). On the other hand, according to Singer, 'merely' sentient beings (this includes animals, human infants and the severely retarded) are not self-conscious - they do not see themselves as distinct entities existing over time - so they are unable to have a preference for continued existence and as a consequence no wrong is done if they are killed painlessly (Singer 1993: 95).

Utilitarianism has a number of criticisms, as does Singer's conception of persons. I will address the criticisms of utilitarianism now and the criticisms of Singer's conception of personhood later on. To begin, utilitarianism is concerned with the aggregate balance of pleasure over pain - yet the quantitative preoccupation of the theory undermines its ability to recognize qualitative differences amongst pleasures or preferences (Benton 1996: 22). Pleasures and preferences differ not only in degree of intensity but also in kind or quality (Benton 1996: 22). Ted Benton rightly asks, "how many bars of Mahler symphony are equivalent to a good meal?" (Benton 1996: 22). Secondly, utilitarianism seems to suggest that if an aggregate benefit could be achieved by the mistreatment of an innocent being it is justified, indeed it is the right thing to do! (Benton 1996: 23). This goes against very pervasive moral intuitions that it is wrong to treat individuals solely as means to our ends (Benton 1996: 23). Most people intuit that no matter the supposed benefit it is wrong to mistreat an innocent individual (Benton 1996: 23). Lastly, the 'equality' that utilitarianism purports is misunderstood. To utilitarians, it is not individuals that are counted equally; it is their mental states (Regan 1991: 52). Individuals are then receptacles of value - containers into which value is poured - in this way treating them as resources can be sanctioned (Regan 1991: 52).

An alternative moral theory to utilitarianism is rights theory. Rights or deontological theory is a non-consequentialist moral theory - it says that whether an act is right or wrong is inherent in the act itself (Benton 1996: 23). Supporters of this view believe that individuals can never be treated as means - they are ends in themselves (Benton 1996: 23).

Tom Regan is the most well known proponent of rights theory in the debate over whether or not we should extend moral consideration to animals (Benton 1996: 23). Regan believes, unlike most Kantians, that there is no moral justification for denying moral consideration to beings who cannot bear moral responsibility (Benton 1996: 24). Moral agents have direct duties to other individuals who are not moral agents - they are called moral patients (Benton 1996: 24). According to Regan whether or not an individual is a moral patient and is hence entitled to moral consideration is dependant on whether or not they possess inherent value (Benton 1996: 24). For Regan a sufficient criterion for possessing inherent value is being a 'subject of a life'. Subjects of a life are "...the experiencing subjects of a life that fares well or ill for them over time, those who have an individual experiential welfare, logically independent of their utility relative to the interests or welfare of others" (Regan 1991: 57). Regan suggests that mammals above the age of 1 are subjects of a life and therefore must have inherent value (Benton 1996: 24). Moral agents have a responsibility to treat moral patients with respect. That is, to refrain from harming them.

Unlike Singer, Regan argues that intentionally killing a moral patient is wrong - an untimely death is the ultimate harm for 'subjects of a life' as loss of life is the ultimate deprivation. Regans position affords greater protection for animals than Singers utilitarianism as the rights view does not turn on calculations of utility (so individual welfare cannot be sacrificed for the benefit of others) and Regan acknowledges that 'subjects of a life' who don't meet Singers criteria for personhood are nonetheless harmed when they are killed (Benton 1996: 24; Regan 1991: 56). One criticism of Regans position is the arbitrary line he draws when he claims that mammals over the age of one are subjects of a life (Benton 1996: 24). Why the age of one? How did he come to this conclusion? Is it possible that the age differs across mammalian species?

Whereas animal advocates are few amongst right theorists and utilitarians the supporters of one theory, if it can be called a moral theory, claim that their theory as a whole extends moral consideration beyond the human community (Regan 1991: 132). It is called deep ecology. The central tenet of deep ecology is "...the idea that we can make no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. That there is no bifurcation in reality between the human and non-human worlds..." (Warwick Fox in Regan 1991: 132). What deep ecologists profess to oppose is the belief that only human interests have value (Regan 1991: 135). Deep ecologists claim to reject the modern western self, which they define as an isolated ego seeking hedonistic gratification (Regan 1991: 133). As we shall see deep ecologists fall drastically short of what they profess to believe in.

We can see this in the pro-hunting literature written by deep ecologists. Deep ecologist Ortega Y Gasset writes that blood has "unequalled orgiastic power" (Regan 1991: 136). Another deep ecologist Randall Eaton writes, "the hunter's feeling for his prey is one of deep passion [and] ecstasy...The hunter loves the animal he kills" (Regan 1991: 136). Aldo Leopold writes, "The instinct that finds delight in the sight and pursuit of game is bred into every fibre of the human race" (Regan 1991:137). As we can see the imagery here can only be described as hedonistic. Deep ecology is nothing other than a bastion of domination and power and the 'instinct' that Leopold speaks of is but a malevolent patriarchal sickness (Regan 1991:138). To Eaton's statement that "...the hunter loves the animals he kills", we can reply, "yes, just as the rapist loves the woman he rapes!" (Regan 1991:138). In the words of philosopher Marti Kheel, "The mind-set that [these writers] reveal is that of a psychological instrumentalism in which the animal is seen, not as a unique, living being but rather as a means to achieve a desired psychological state. The animal is thus reduced to the status of object or symbol" (Regan 1991: 136). Deep ecology fails to properly consider animals as part of the moral community. What's more, its preoccupation with self-interestedness, its non-adoption of the principle of equal consideration (which is central to all moral theories) and its legitimisation of power and domination precludes it from being a moral theory.

Another rights theorist who advocates the extension of moral consideration beyond the human community is Gary Francione. Francione has risen to prominence in the animals debate since the publication of his groundbreaking work 'Introduction to Animal Rights: Your child or the dog?'

Francione argues that we have a moral intuition that "it is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals", yet our actions fall well short of our moral wisdom (Francione 2000: xxii, xxiv). The routine suffering we inflict on animals is unnecessary in every sense of the word. The reason for the disparity between our intuitions and our actions is that animals are considered property (Francione 2000: xxiv). When we balance the interests of humans against animals we balance the interests of property owners against property - it is no great surprise then that the balance is never in favour of animals (Francione 2000: xxiv). As Francione says, "If someone suggested that you balance your interests against those of your automobile or your wristwatch, you would quite correctly regard the suggestion as absurd" (Francione 2000: xxv).

It is generally agreed that all humans irrespective of race, sex or intelligence have the basic right not to be treated as property (Francione 2000: xxviii). We can come to this conclusion through logic: if human interests are to count morally, then it follows that humans cannot be resources (Francione 2000: 93). If one human treats another as a resource then the former human determines the value of the interests of the latter human irrespective of what will benefit the latter human (Francione 2000: 93). The interests of the human who is a resource can never be given equal consideration with the interests of the human who is the resource user (Francione 2000: 93). The principle of equal consideration demands that humans cannot be resources (Francione 2000: 93, 98).

Francione argues that there is no moral justification for attributing to all humans, from infants to the severely retarded, the basic right not to be treated as property whilst simultaneously denying the same right to animals (Francione 2000: xxvii). Francione believes that the only requirement for entry into the moral community is sentience. This is contrary to Regan who uses the more stringent requirement of 'subject-of-a-life' to decide 'who's in or out' (Francione 2000: xxxii). Animals have an experiential welfare - things can fare well or ill for them logically independent of their use as a resource (Francione 2000: xxxiii, 99)

According to Francione, in recognising that the principle of equal consideration applies to animals as well humans - animals become persons (Francione 2000: 100). Singer would deny this - he would say that persons are self-conscious whereas merely sentient beings are not. Francione argues that Singer's conception of persons is incorrect. In his book Animal Minds Harvard biologist Donald Griffin comments "...[if an animal is sentient] the animal's own body and its own actions must fall within the scope of its perceptual awareness...And if the animal is perceptually conscious of its own body, then it is difficult to rule out similar recognition that it, itself, is doing the running, climbing or chasing" (Francione 2000: 114). Griffin ends, "if we grant that animals are capable of perceptual awareness, denying them some level of self awareness would seen to be an arbitrary and unjustified restriction" (Francione 2000: 114). Francione points out that to be sentient is by definition to be self-aware because being sentient means "...to be the sort of being who recognizes that it is that being, and not some other, who is experiencing the suffering that it has an interest in not experiencing" (Francione 2000: 114).

Contrary to Singer's thoughts on merely sentient beings, Francione argues that to kill a merely sentient being inflicts harm on that individual because being sentient logically entails an interest (and an awareness of the interest) in continued life (Francione 2000:137). Animals don't have to think about how many years they will live or express in a human language that they don't want to die in order to have an interest in continued existence (Francione 2000: 138).Evolution created sentience in order to make certain the survival of particular complex organisms - sentience is the means to the end of remaining alive (Francione 2000: 137, 138). In this way, sentient beings have an interest in maximising the length of their lives - not just an interest in how pleasant their life is (Francione 2000: 137).

In conclusion, after surveying the approaches of the various theories towards the question in contention it can be seen that mere sentience is all that is needed to be included in the moral community. Morality requires that we extend moral consideration beyond the human community to all sentient life. Plants do not have interests - only sentient beings have interests - so they are excluded from the moral community. Rights theorist Gary Francione has offered strong reasons for the belief that killing a merely sentient being does harm to that being; now the onus of proof is on the sceptics.

Bibliography

Francione (2000). Introduction to Animal Rights: Your child or the dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Garner, R. (1996). "Animal Rights, Moral Theory and Political Strategy", In Robert Garner (Ed.), Animal Rights: The changing debate. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
Regan, T. (1991). The Thee Generation: Reflections on the coming revolution. Philadelphia : Temple University Press.
Singer, P. (1996). "Animal Liberation". In Robert Garner (Ed.), Animal Rights: The changing debate. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wise, S.M. (2000). Rattling the cage: Towards legal rights for animals. Cambridge, Massacchusetts: Perseus Publishing.

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